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Abstract
In this paper we estimate the rate of return to ﬁrm investments in human capital in
the form of formal job training. We use a panel of large ﬁrms with unusually detailed
information on the duration of training, the direct costs of training, and several ﬁrm
characteristics such as their output, workforce characteristics and capital stock. Our
estimates of the return to training vary substantially across ﬁrms. On average it is
-7% for ﬁrms not providing training and 24% for those providing training. Formal job
training is a good investment for many ﬁrms and the economy, possibly yielding higher
returns than either investments in physical capital or investments in schooling. In spite
of this, observed amounts of formal training are very small.
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Europe is struggling to become a competitive and dynamic knowledge economy in the mod-
ern world. One key ingredient in its strategy is likely to be the investment in human capital.
Although individuals invest in human capital over the whole life-cycle, more than one half of
lifetime human capital is accumulated through post-school investments on the ﬁrm (Heck-
man, Lochner and Taber, 1998). This happens either through learning by doing or through
formal on-the-job training. In spite of its importance, economists know surprisingly less
about the incentives and returns to ﬁrms of investing in training compared with what they
know about the individual’s returns of investing in schooling.1 Similarly, the study of ﬁrm
investments in physical capital is much more developed than the study of ﬁrm investments
in human capital, even though the latter may well be at least as important as the former in
modern economies. In this paper we estimate the internal rate of return of ﬁrm investments
in human capital. We use a census of large manufacturing ﬁrms in Portugal between 1995
and 1999 with detailed information on investments in training, its costs, and several ﬁrm
characteristics.2
Most of the empirical work to date has focused on obtaining estimates of the return to
training for workers using data on wages (e.g., Bartel, 1995, Arulampalam, Booth and Elias,
1997, Mincer, 1989, Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005). Even though this exercise is very useful,
it has important drawbacks (e.g., Pischke, 2005). For example, with imperfect labor markets
1An important part of the lifelong learning strategies are the public training programs. There is much
more evidence about the eﬀectiveness (or lack of it) of such programs compared with the available evidence
on the eﬀectiveness of the private on-the-job training.
2We will consider only formal training programs and abstract from the fact that formal and informal
training could be very correlated. This is a weakness of most of the literature, since informal training is very
hard to measure.
2wages do not fully reﬂect the marginal product of labor, and therefore the wage return to
training tells us little about the eﬀect of training on productivity. Moreover, the “eﬀect” of
training on wages depends on whether training is ﬁrm speciﬁc or general (e.g., Becker, 1962,
Leuven, 2004).3 As in the literature that focus on the eﬀects of training on productivity,
our parameter of interest is the return to training for employers and employees as a whole,
irrespective of how these returns are shared between the two parties. In contrast, most of the
literature on the wage returns to training focuses on the return to training for the individual
employee. The few papers estimating the eﬀects of training on productivity have little or
no mention of the costs of training (e.g. Bartel, 1991, 1994, 2000, Black and Lynch, 1998,
Barret and O’Connell, 1999, Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2005). This happens most
probably due to lack of adequate data. As a result, we cannot interpret the estimates in
these papers as well deﬁned rates of return.4
The data we use is unusually rich for this exercise since it contains information on the
duration of training, direct costs of training to the ﬁrm as well as productivity data. This
allow us to estimate both a production and a cost function and to obtain estimates of the
marginal beneﬁts and costs of training to the ﬁrm. In order to estimate the total marginal
costs of training, we need information on the direct cost of training and on the foregone
productivity cost of training. The ﬁrst is observed in our data while the second is the
marginal product of worker’s time while training. The major problems in this exercise are
the treatment of omitted variables and the endogenous choice of inputs in the production and
3For example, Leuven and Oosterbek (2002, 2004) argue that they may be ﬁnding low or no eﬀects of
training because they are using individual wages as opposed to ﬁrm productivity.
4This shortcoming of the literature as been emphasized in Mincer (1989) and Machin and Vignoles (2001)
among others.
3cost functions. Given the panel structure of our data, we address these issues applying the
methods developed in Blundell and Bond (2000), which build on Arellano and Bond (1991)
and Arellano and Bover (1995). In particular, we estimate the cost and production functions
using a ﬁrst diﬀerence instrumental variable approach. By computing ﬁrst diﬀerences we
control for ﬁrm unobservable and time invariant characteristics. By using lagged values
of inputs to instrument current diﬀerences in inputs (together with lagged diﬀerences in
inputs to instrument current levels) we account for any correlation between input choices
and transitory productivity or cost shocks. Our instruments are valid as long as the ﬁrst
diﬀerences of transitory shocks in the production and cost functions do not exhibit high order
serial correlation. In our empirical application we allow for ﬁrst order serial correlation but
not for higher order serial correlation.
Several interesting facts emerge from our empirical analysis. First, in line with the
previous literature (e.g., Pischke, 2005, Bassanini, Booth, De Paola and Leuven, 2005) our
estimates of the eﬀects of training on productivity are quite high: an increase in the amount
of training per employee of 10 hours per year, leads to an increase in current productivity of
0.6%. Increases in future productivity are dampened by the rate of depreciation of human
capital but are still substantial. In a rough comparison, this estimate is below other estimates
of the beneﬁts of training in the literature (e.g., Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2005,
Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1999). If the marginal productivity of labor were constant
(linear technology), an increase in the amount of training per employee by 10 hours would
translate into foregone productivity costs of at most 0.5% of output (assuming all training
4occurred during working hours).5 With decreasing marginal product of labor (and because
roughly 50% of training occurs outside normal working time) foregone productivity is much
lower.
Second, we estimate that, on average, foregone productivity accounts for less than 25%
of the total costs of training. This ﬁnding is of interest for two reasons. On the one hand, it
shows that the simple returns to schooling intuition is inadequate for studying the returns
to training. In particular, the coeﬃcient on training in a production function is unlikely to
be a good estimate of the return to training.6 On the other hand, without information on
direct costs of training, estimates of the return to training will be too high since direct costs
account for the majority of training costs.
Finally, our estimates of the internal rate of return to training vary across ﬁrms. While
investments in human capital have on average negative return for those ﬁrms which do
not provide training, returns for ﬁrms providing training are quite high (24%). Such high
returns suggest that on-the-job training is a good investment for ﬁrms and for the economy
as a whole, possibly yielding higher returns than either investments in physical capital or
investments in schooling.
As a consequence, it is puzzling why these ﬁrm train on average such a small proportion
of the total hours of work (less than 1%). One hypothesis is that suboptimal amounts of
training may be the result of a coordination problem, as emphasized in Pischke (2005).
Given that the beneﬁts of training need to be shared between ﬁrms and workers, each party
individually only sees part of the total beneﬁt of training.7 Unless investment decisions
5For an individual working 2000 hours a year, 10 hours corresponds to 0.5% of annual working hours.
6This is also likely to be a problem in wage regressions.
7This may be also due to the so called ”poaching externality” (Stevens, 1994). See also Acemoglu and
5are coordinated and decided jointly, ineﬃcient levels of investment may arise. Furthermore,
information problems and uncertainty in this investment in human capital may lead ﬁrms
to invest small amounts in training even though the ex post average return is high. Even
though under our current set up we cannot distinguish how much of the variability in returns
across ﬁrms is due to heterogeneity and how much is due to uncertainty we ﬁnd an enormous
dispersion in the ex post returns to training which may be suggestive of the importance of
uncertainty. For example, in our base speciﬁcation the 5th percentile of the distribution of
internal rates of return is -16% and the 95% percentile is 66%. Finally, it is possible that
ﬁrms would like to invest more in their workers but they are unable to do so because they
are constrained (e.g., credit constrained). In that case, investments in training are likely to
be suboptimal. Unfortunately we cannot verify empirically the importance of each of these
diﬀerent hypotheses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use. In section 3, we
present our basic framework for estimating the production function and the cost function. In
section 4 we present our empirical estimates of the costs and beneﬁts of training and compute
the marginal internal rate of return for investments in training. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
We use data from an annual survey collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment
(Balanco Social) covering all the ﬁrms with more than 100 employees operating in Portugal.
The survey is mandatory and collects information on hours of training provided by the
Pischke (1998, 1999) for an analysis of the consequences of imperfect labor markets for ﬁrm provision of
general training.
6employers and on the direct training costs at the ﬁrm level. Other variables available at the
ﬁrm level include the ﬁrm’s location, ISIC 5-digit sector of activity, value added, number
of workers and a measure of the capital, given by the book value of capital depreciation8,
average age of the workforce and share of males in the workforce. It also collects several
measures of the ﬁrm’s employment practices such as the number of hires and ﬁres within a
year (which will be important to determine average worker turnover within the ﬁrm). We
use information for manufacturing ﬁrms between 1995-1999. This gives us a panel of 1,500
ﬁrms (corresponding to 5,501 ﬁrm-year observations). On average, 53% of the ﬁrms in the
sample provide some training.
Relative to other datasets that are used in the literature, the one we use has several
advantages for computing the internal rates of return of investments in training. First, in-
formation is reported by the employer. This may be better than having employee reported
information about past training if the employee recalls less and more imprecisely the infor-
mation about on-the-job training. Second, training is reported for all employees in the ﬁrm,
not just new hires. Third, the survey is mandatory for ﬁrms with more than 100 employees
(34% of the total workforce in 1995). This is an advantage since a lot of the empirical work
in the literature uses small sample sizes and the response rates on employer surveys tend
to be low.9 Fourth, it collects longitudinal information for training hours, ﬁrm productivity
and direct training costs at the ﬁrm level. More than 50% of the ﬁrms are observed at least
8We assume that depreciation is a linear function of the book value of the ﬁrm’s capital stock : Dept =
π ∗ Kt.
9Bartel (1991) uses a survey conducted by the Columbia Business School with a 6% response rate. Black
and Lynch (1997) use data on the Educational Quality of the Worforce National Employers survey, which is
a telephone conducted survey with a 64% ”complete” response rate. Barrett and O’Connell (2001) expand
an EU survey and obtain a 33% response rate.
7twice during the period 1995-1999.10
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables in the analysis. We
divide the sample according to whether the ﬁrm provides any formal training and, if it does,
whether the yearly total training hours are above the median (1,489 hours) for the ﬁrms
that provide training. We choose to report medians rather than means to avoid extreme
sensitivity to extreme values. Firms that oﬀer training programs and have a high training
intensity have a higher value added per employee and are larger than low training ﬁrms
and ﬁrms that do not oﬀer training. Total hours on the job per employee (either working
or training) do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across types of ﬁrms. High training ﬁrms also have a
higherstock of physical capital. The workforce in ﬁrms that provide training is more educated
and is older than the workforce in ﬁrms that do not oﬀer training. The proportion of workers
with bachelor or college degrees is 6% and 3% in high and low training ﬁrms, versus 1% in
non-training ﬁrms. The workforce in ﬁrms that oﬀer training has a higher proportion of male
workers.11 These ﬁrms also tend to have a higher proportion of more skilled occupations
such as higher managers and middle managers, as well as a lower proportion of apprentices.
High and low training ﬁrms diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their training intensity. Firms with a
small amount of training (deﬁned as being below the median) oﬀer 1.6 hours of training per
employee per year while those that oﬀer a large amount of training oﬀer 19 hours of training.
Even though the diﬀerence between the two groups of ﬁrms is large, the number of training
hours even for high training ﬁrms looks very small when compared with the 2055 average
10Firms can leave the sample because they exit the market or because total employment is reduced to less
than 100 employees.
11Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004) also ﬁnd evidence for European countries that training incidence
is higher among men, and is positively associated with high educational attainment and a high position in
the wage distribution.
8annual hours on-the-job for the (0.9% of total time on-the-job). High training ﬁrms spend
almost 8 times more in training per employee than low training ﬁrms. These costs are 0.05%
and 0.3% of value added respectively. This proportion is rather small, but is in line with the
small amounts of training being provided.
In sum, ﬁrms train a rather small amount of hours. This pattern is similar to other
countries in the south of Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain) as well as in Eastern Europe (e.g.,
Bassanini, Booth, De Paola and Leuven, 2005). We ﬁnd a lot of heterogeneity among the
ﬁrms that oﬀer training, with low and high training ﬁrms being very diﬀerent. Finally, ﬁrms
spend a small proportion of their value added with formal training programs which is in line
with training a small proportion of the working hours.
3. Basic Framework
Our parameter of interest is the internal rate of return to the ﬁrm of an additional hour of
training per employee. Let MBt+s be the marginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of training
in t and MCt be the marginal cost of the investment in training at t. Assuming that the cost
is all incurred in one period and that the investment generates beneﬁts in the subsequent
N periods, the internal rate of return of the investment is given by the rate r that equalizes




(1 + r)s − MC
T
t = 0 (3.1)
Training involves a direct cost and a foregone productivity cost. Let the marginal training
cost be given by: MCT
t = MCt + MFPt, where MCt is the marginal direct cost and
9MFPt is the marginal product of foregone worker time. In the next sections we lay out the
basic framework which we use to estimate the components of MCT
t and MBt+s. To obtain
estimates for MFPt and MBt+s, in section 3.1 we estimate a production function and to
obtain estimates for MCt in section 3.2 we will estimate a cost function.
3.1. Estimating the Production Function
We assume that the ﬁrm’s production function is semi-log linear and that the ﬁrm’s stock





jt exp(γhjt + θZjt +  j + εjt) (3.2)
where Yjt is a measure of output in ﬁrm j and period t, Kjt is a measure of capital stock, Ljt is
the total number of employees in the ﬁrm, hjt is a measure of the stock of human capital per
employee in the ﬁrm and Zjt is a vector of ﬁrm and workforce characteristics. Given that the
production function is assumed to be identical for all the ﬁrms in the sample,  j captures
time-invariant ﬁrm heterogeneity and εjt captures time-varying ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity
shocks.
The estimation of production functions is a diﬃcult exercise because inputs are chosen
endogenously by the ﬁrm and because many inputs are unobserved. Even though the inclu-
sion of ﬁrm time invariant eﬀects may mitigate these problems (e.g., Griliches and Mairesse,
1995), this will not suﬃce if, for example, transitory productivity shocks determine the de-
12Most of the papers estimating the eﬀect of training on productivity assume that output is either log-
linear in training (e.g. Barron, Black and Lowenstein, 1989, and Black and Lynch, 1998), or semi log-linear
in trainng (e.g. Bartel, 1991, 1994, Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2000, and Ramirez, 1994).
10cision of providing training (and the choice of other inputs). Recently, several methods have
been proposed for the estimation of production functions, such as Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2000), Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2005) and Blundell and Bond
(2000). In this paper we implement the latter.13 We control for time invariant ﬁrm char-
acteristics that are potentially correlated with the decision to invest in training (and with
the choice of other inputs) by estimating the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences. To account for the
potential correlation between the stock of training and current productivity shocks we use
past measures of training (and past measures of other inputs) to instrument for current train-
ing (and the current use of other inputs). We implement this procedure in a GMM setting
using the approach developed in Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) which builds in Arellano
and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). Our instruments are valid if productivity
shocks in ﬁrst diﬀerences are not too much correlated over time and if we have enough lags
when constructing the instruments. For example, if productivity shocks in ﬁrst diﬀerences
are an AR(1) process we can only use two or more lags of the endogenous variables as instru-
ments. In our empirical work we test and reject that productivity shocks do not exhibit ﬁrst
order correlation in ﬁrst diﬀerences and therefore we use instruments lagged two periods14.
Due to the shortness of the panel neither can we use extra lags nor can we test for higher
order serial correlation of shocks. One advantage of this approach is that it also corrects for
biases generated by measurement error in inputs.
Following Blundell and Bond (2000) we assume that the productivity shocks in equation
13Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2005) use a similar approach to estimate the eﬀects of training on
productivity using with industry level data for the UK.
14First order autocorrelation can be due, for example, to measurement error in output (e.g., Blundell and
Bond, 2000).
11(3.2) follow an AR(1) process:
εjt = ρεjt−1 + ϕjt (3.3)
where ϕjt is for now assumed to be an i.i.d. process and 0 < ρ < 1. Taking logs from
equation (3.2) and substituting yields the following common factor representation:
lnYjt = lnAt + αlnKjt + β lnLjt + γhjt + θZjt +  j + ϕjt (3.4)
+ρlnYjt−1 − ρlnAt−1 − ραlnKjt−1 − ρβ lnLjt−1 − ργhjt−1 − ρθZjt−1 − ρ j.
Grouping common terms we obtain the reduced form version of the model above.
lnYjt = π0 + π1 lnKjt + π2 lnLjt + π3hjt + π4Zjt + (3.5)
+π5 lnYjt−1 + π6 lnKjt−1 + π7 lnLjt−1 + π8hjt−1 + π9Zjt−1 + υj + ϕjt.
subject to the common factor restrictions (e.g., π6 = −π5π1,π7 = −π5π2), where υj =
(1 − ρ) j.
We start by estimating the unrestricted model in equation (3.4) and then impose (and
test) the common factor restrictions using minimum distance (Chamberlain, 1984). Empir-
ically, we measure Yjt with the ﬁrm’s value added, Kjt with book value of capital and Ljt
with the total number of employees. Zjt includes time varying ﬁrm and workforce charac-
teristics - the proportion of males in the workforce, a cubic polynomial in the average age of
the workforce, occupational distribution of the workforce and the average education of the
workforce (measured by the proportion workers with high education) - as well as time, region
and sector eﬀects. hjt will be computed for each ﬁrm-year using information on the training
12history of each ﬁrm and making assumptions on the average knowledge depreciation.
We assume that average human capital in the ﬁrm depreciates for two reasons. On the
one hand, skills acquired in the past become less valuable as knowledge becomes obsolete and
workers forget past learning. This type of knowledge depreciation aﬀects the human capital
of all the workforce in the ﬁrm. We assume that one unit of knowledge at the beginning of
the period depreciates at rate δ per period. On the other hand, average human capital in
the ﬁrm depreciates because each period new workers enter the ﬁrm without training while
workers leave the ﬁrm, taking with them ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge. Using the permanent
inventory formula for the accumulation of human capital yields the following law of motion
for human capital (abstracting from j):
Hjt+1 = ((1 − δ)hjt + ijt)(Ljt − Ejt) + Xjtijt
where Hjt is total human capital in the ﬁrm in period t (Hjt = Ljthjt), Xjt is the number
of new workers in period t, Ejt is the number of workers leaving the ﬁrm in period t and it
is the amount of training per employee in period t.15 At the end of period t, the stock of
human capital in the ﬁrm is given by the human capital of those Ljt−Ejt workers that were
in the ﬁrm in the beginning of the period t (these workers have a stock of human capital
and receive some training on top of that) plus the training of the Xjt new workers. This
speciﬁcation implies that the stock of human capital per employee is given by:
15We assume that all entries and exits occur at the beggining of the period. We also ignore the fact that
workers who leave may be of diﬀerent vintage than those who stay. Instead we assume that they are a
random sample of the existing workers in the ﬁrm (who on average have ht units of human capital).
13hjt+1 = (1 − δ)hjtφjt + ijt (3.6)
where φjt =
Ljt−Ejt
Ljt+1 and 0 ≤ φjt ≤ 1.
Under these assumptions, skill depreciation in the model is given by (1−δ)φjt. We assume
that δ = 17% per period (although we will examine the robustness of our ﬁndings to this
assumption).16 We estimate the turnover rate from the data since we have information on
the initial and end of the period workforce as well as on the number of workers who leave the
ﬁrm (average turnover in the sample is 14%).. The average skill depreciation in our sample
is 25% per period. We measure ijt with the average hours of training per employee in the
ﬁrm.17 Since we cannot observe the initial stock of human capital in the ﬁrm (h0), we face
a problem of initial conditions. Under some restrictions the eﬀect of h0 on ﬁrm productivity
can be subsumed in the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect of equation (3.5).18
16Our choice of 17% is based on Lillard and Tan (1986), who estimate an average depreciation in the ﬁrm
is between 15% and 20% per year. Alternatively, we could have estimated δ from the data. Our attempts
to do so yielded very imprecise estimates.
17In approximately 3% of the ﬁrm-year observations we had missing information on training although we
could observe it in the period before and after. To avoid losing this information, we assumed the average of
the lead and lagged training values. This assumption is likely to have minor implications in the construction
of the human capital variables because there were few of these cases.
18More precisely, we can write:




where hj0 is the ﬁrm’s human capital the ﬁrst period the ﬁrm is observed in the sample (unobservable in
our data). Plugging this expression into the production function gives:
lnYjt = lnAt + αlnKjt + β lnLjt + γ
t−1 ￿
s=1
(1 − δ)s−1φjt−s...φjt−1ijt−s + θZjt +  jt + εjt
where  jt = γ(1−δ)tφj1...φjt−1hj0. However,  jt becomes a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect if skills fully depreciate (δ = 1
or φjt = 0 for all t) or if there is no depreciation (δ = 0) and turnover is constant (φjt = φj). If 0 < δ < 1 and
0 < φjt < 1, then  jt depreciates every period at rate (1 − δ)φjt. If hj0 is correlated with the future sequence
of ijt+s then the production function estimates will be biased, and our instrumental variable strategy will
not address this problem. However, it is possible to estimate h0 by including in the production function a
14We are interested in computing the internal rate of return of an additional hour of training
per employee in the ﬁrm. From the estimates of the production function we can directly
compute the current marginal product of training (MBt+1). We assume that future marginal
product of current training (MBt+s,s =1 ) is equal to current marginal product of training
minus human capital depreciation. To obtain an estimate for the MFPjt, we must compute
the marginal product of one hour of work for each employee. Since our measure of labor
input is the number of employees in the ﬁrm, we approximate the marginal product of an
additional hour of work for all employees by
MPLjt
(Hours per Employeejt)Ljt (where MPLjt is the
marginal product of an additional worker in ﬁrm j and period t).19 Finally, since part of the
training occurs outside the normal working hours and our data set includes information on
this share for each ﬁrm, we need to transform the marginal product of one hour of work into
the marginal foregone cost of one hour of training. In our data, only 52% (on average) of
the training hours takes place during normal working hours. To estimate marginal foregone
productivity we multiply the marginal product of labor by this proportion for each ﬁrm.
3.2. The Costs of Training for the Firm
In the previous section we described how to obtain estimates of the marginal product of
labor and, therefore, of the foregone productivity cost of training. Here we focus on the
direct costs of training. To estimate MCt, we need data on the direct cost of training. These
include labor payments to teachers or training institutions, training equipment such as books
ﬁrm speciﬁc dummy variable whose coeﬃcient decreases over time at a ﬁxed and known rate (1 − δ)φt. This
procedure is quite demanding in terms of computation and data, and in the present version of the paper we
assume we can be reasonably approximate the terms involving h0 with a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect.
19Alternatively, we could have included per capita hours of work directly in the production function.
Because there is little variation in this variable across ﬁrms and across time, our estimates were very imprecise.
15or movies, and costs related to the depreciation of training equipment (including buildings
and machinery). Such information is rarely available in ﬁrm level data sets. Our data is
unusually rich for this exercise since it contains information on the duration of training,
direct costs of training and training subsidies.
We model the direct cost function with a quadratic spline in the total hours of training
provided by the ﬁrm to all employees, with three knots. The knots correspond to the 90th,
95th and 99th percentiles of the distribution of training hours. Our objective is to have a
more ﬂexible form at the extreme of the function where there is less data, to avoid the whole










where Cjt is the direct cost of training, Ijt is the total hours of training, Dzt is a dummy
variable that assumes the value one when Ijt > kz (z = 1,2,3), k1 = 15,945, k2 = 32,854,
k3 = 125,251,Ds are year dummies, ηj is a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect and ξj is a time varying cost
shock. We estimate the model using the Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) system GMM
estimator (ﬁrst diﬀerencing eliminates ηj and instrumenting accounts for possible further
endogeneity of Ijt). Empirically, Cjt is the direct cost supported by the ﬁrm (it diﬀers from
the total direct cost of training by the training subsidies), and Ijt is the total hours of training
provided by the ﬁrm in period t.
From the above estimates we obtain
∂Cjt
∂Ijt . To obtain the marginal direct costs of an




Table 2 presents the estimated coeﬃcients on labor and on the stock of training for alterna-
tive estimates of the production function.20 Column (1) reports the ordinary least squares
estimates of the log-linear version of equation (3.2), column (2) reports the ﬁrst diﬀerences
estimates of the log-linear version of equation (3.2) and column (3) reports the system-GMM
estimates of equation (3.5) (Blundell and Bond, 2000). For the latter speciﬁcation we report
the coeﬃcients after imposing the common factor restrictions. We also present the p-values
for two tests for the latter speciﬁcation: one is a test of the validity of the common fac-
tor restrictions, the other is an overidentiﬁcation (Hansen) test. We can neither reject the
overidentiﬁcation restrictions nor the common factor restrictions.21 Our preferred estimates
are in column (3) because they account for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and endogenous input choice.
Columns (1) and (2) are presented for completeness.
The estimated beneﬁts in all the columns of table 2 seem to be quite high: a increase in
the amount of training per employee of 10 hours (approximately 0.5% of the total amount
of hours worked in a year22) leads to an increase in current value-added between 0.6% and
1.3%. As far as they can be compared, this estimate is in line with (and if anything is smaller
than) other estimates of the beneﬁts of training in the literature (e.g., Dearden, Reed and
Van Reenen, 2005, Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1999). If the marginal product of labor
20The estimated coeﬃcients for full set of variables included in the regression are presented in table A1 in
the annex.
21We estimate the model using the xtabond2 command for STATA, developed by Roodman (2005).
22For an individual working 2000 hours a year, 10 hours corresponds to 0.5% of annual working hours.
17were constant (linear technology), an increase in the amount of training per employee by
10 hours would translate into foregone productivity costs of at most 0.5% of output (if all
training occurred during working hours). With decreasing marginal product of labor (and
because roughly 50% of training occurs outside normal working time) foregone productivity
is much lower. Given that the impact of training on productivity lasts for more than just
one period, ignoring direct costs would lead us to implausibly large estimates of the return
to training. As explained in the previous section, we use the coeﬃcient on labor input in
table 2 to quantify the importance of foregone productivity costs of training for each ﬁrm.
The results of estimating the direct training cost function in equation (3.7) are reported
in table 3. Again, for completeness we report the estimates for diﬀerent methods. Col-
umn (1) estimates the equation in levels with ordinary least squares, column (2) estimates
the equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences with least squares and column (3) estimates equation with
system-GMM. The latter are again our preferred estimates since they account for ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects and for the correlation between training and transitory cost shocks.
On average, foregone productivity accounts for less than 25% of the total costs of training.
This ﬁnding is of great potential interest for two related reasons. First, it shows that a simple
returns to schooling intuition is inadequate for studying the returns to training. In particular,
it is unlikely that we can just read the return to training from the coeﬃcient on training
in a production function.23 Second, without data on direct costs estimates of the return to
investments in training lack some credibility given that direct costs account for the majority
of training costs. Unfortunately it is impossible to assess the extent to which this result is
23As emphasized in Mincer (1989), this is likely to also be a problem in wage regressions.
18generalizable to other datasets (in other countries) because similar data is rarely available.
Table 4 presents the estimates of the internal rate of return of an extra hour of training
for per employee for an average ﬁrm in our sample, the average return for ﬁrms providing
training and the average return for ﬁrms not providing training.24 In columns (1)-(5) we
display the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent assumptions about the rate of human capital
depreciation. The production function estimates underlying this table are reported in table
A2. They diﬀer across columns because the construction of the human capital measure
depends on the rate of skill depreciation we assume ( as explained in section 3.1). In our
base speciﬁcation, where we assume a 17% depreciation rate, the average marginal internal
rate of return is 9% for the whole sample. The average return is negative (-7%) for ﬁrms not
providing training and quite high (24%) for the set of ﬁrms oﬀering training.
The negative returns for ﬁrms not providing training is a constant feature across the
columns in this table. We conjecture that these ﬁrms do not oﬀer training precisely because
they face low returns and therefore they may be acting rationally and optimally. However,
the returns for ﬁrms providing training are quite high, our lower bound being of 17% and our
preferred estimate being 24% (ignoring the estimates where we assume a 100% depreciation
rate). With such high returns, it is puzzling why ﬁrms train such a small proportion of the
total hours of work (less than 1%25). One hypothesis is that suboptimal amounts of training
may be the result of a coordination problem, as emphasized in Pischke (2005). Given that
the beneﬁts of training need to be shared between ﬁrms and workers, each party individually
24In this paper heterogeneity in returns across ﬁrms does not come from a random coeﬃcients speciﬁcation,
but from non-linearity in training and labor input in the production and cost functions.
25From table 1 we can see that, in ﬁrms providing high amounts of training, hours trained per employee
per year are on average 19, while hours worked per employee per year are above 1800.
19only sees part of the total beneﬁt of training. Unless investment decisions are coordinated
and decided jointly, ineﬃcient levels of investment may arise. Furthermore, information
problems and uncertainty in this investment in human capital may lead ﬁrms to invest small
amounts in training even though the ex post average return is high. Even though under
our current set up we cannot distinguish how much of the variability in returns across ﬁrms
is due to heterogeneity and how much is due to uncertainty (as in, for example, Carneiro,
Hansen and Heckman, 2003), we ﬁnd an enormous dispersion in the ex post returns to
training which may be suggestive of the importance of uncertainty. For example, in our base
speciﬁcation the 5th percentile of the distribution of internal rates of return is -16% and the
95% percentile is 66%. Finally, it is possible that ﬁrms would like to invest more in their
workers but they are unable to do so because they are constrained (e.g., credit constrained).
In that case, investments in training are likely to be suboptimal. Unfortunately we cannot
verify empirically the importance of each of these diﬀerent hypotheses.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the internal rate of return of ﬁrm investments in human capital. We
use a census of large manufacturing ﬁrms in Portugal between 1995 and 1999 with unusually
detailed information on investments in training, its costs, and several ﬁrm characteristics.
Our parameter of interest is the return to training for employers and employees as a whole,
irrespective of how these returns are shared between these two parties.
We document the empirical importance of adequately accounting for the costs of train-
ing when computing the return to ﬁrm investments in human capital. In particular, unlike
20schooling, direct costs of training account for about 75% of the total costs of training (fore-
gone productivity only accounts for 25%). Therefore, it is not possible to read the return
to ﬁrm investments in human capital from the coeﬃcient on training in a regression of pro-
ductivity on training. Data on direct costs is essential for computing meaningful estimates
of the internal rate of return to these investments.
our estimates of the internal rate of return to training vary across ﬁrms. While invest-
ments in human capital have on average negative returns for those ﬁrms which do not provide
training, we estimate that the returns for ﬁrms providing training are quite high, our lower
bound being of 17% and our preferred estimate being 24%. Such high returns suggest that
company job training is a sound investment for ﬁrms and for the economy as a whole, pos-
sibly yielding higher returns than either investments in physical capital or investments in
schooling. Therefore, it is puzzling why these ﬁrms train on average such a small proportion
of the total hours of work (less than 1%). We suggest three possible explanations: 1) coordi-
nation failures between employers and employees; 2) uncertainty in the returns to training;
3) credit constraints. Unfortunately we cannot assess the empirical importance (if any) of
each of these hypotheses.
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24No Training Firms Low Training Firms High Training Firms
Value added / Employees 141,143      17,720                 26,000                   
Employees 157   176   308   
Hours work / Employees 2,043   2,044   2,056   
Book Value Capital Depreciation  248,035   595,765   1,562,635   
Share high educated workers 0.01   0.03   0.06   
Average age workforce  37   39   41   
Share males workforce  0.4   0.6   0.7   
Occupations: 
Share top managers 0.01   0.02   0.03   
Share managers 0.02   0.02   0.04   
Share intermediary workers  0.04   0.05   0.05   
Share qualified workers 0.41   0.42   0.43   
Share semi-qualified workers  0.20   0.20   0.21   
Share non-qualified workers  0.04   0.05   0.03   
Share apprenteces 0.03   0.02   0.001   
Training hours / Employees -    1.66   19.0   
Training hours / Hours work  - 0.0008   0.009   
Direct Cost / Employee - 10   85   
Direct Cost / Value Added  - 0.001   0.003   
Nb observations 2,578 1,461 1,462
Source: Balanço Social
Table 1: Medians of Main Variables by Training Intensity
Nominal variables in Euros (1995 values). "Low training firms" are firms with at most the median annual hours of training (1,489 )
and "High training firms" are firms with at least the median annual hours of training. Employees is the total number of employees in
the firm. Total Hours/Employees is annual hours of work per employee, Capital's Depreciation is the capital's book value of
depreciation, "Share low educated workers" is the share of workers with at most primary education, Average age is the average age of
the workforce (years), Share males is the share of males in the workforce, Training hours/Employee is the annual training hours per
employee in the firm, Training hours / Hours work is the share training hours in total hours at work, Direct Cost/Employee is the cost
of training per employee and Direct Cost / Value Added is the cost of training as a share of value added.Dependent variable: 
Log Real Value 
Added per 
Employee
Log Real Value Added 
per Employee
Log Real Value 
Added per 
Employee
Method:  OLS- Levels  OLS-First Differences SYS-GMM
(1) (2) (3) 
Training Stock  0.0006 0.0013 0.0006
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0003)*
Log Employees 0.79 0.56 0.77
(0.01)*** (0.057)*** (0.11)***
Observations 4,327 2,816 2,816
P-Value Over-Identification Test - - 0.26
P-Value Common Factor Restrictions - - 0.52
Table 2: Production Function Estimates 
The table presents estimates of the production function assuming that (time invariant) human capital depreciation in the firm is 17%.
Column (1) presents the estimates with ordinary least squares, column (2) with first differences and column (3) with SYS-GMM.
Standard errors in parenthesis, *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All specifications include the
following variables (point estimates not reported): log capital stock, share occupation group, share low educated workers, share
males workforce, cubic polinomial in average age workforce, year dummies, region dummies and 2-digit sector dummies. Dependent variable:  Real Training Cost  Real Training Cost  Real Training Cost 
Method:  OLS- Levels  OLS-First Differences SYS-GMM
(1) (2) (3) 
Training Hours/1000  2046.3 901.6 7107.3
(227.0)*** (331.1)*** (4693.7)
(Training Hours/1000)^2 -57.8 -19.1 -223.2
(12.9)*** (16.7)*** (248.8425)
D1*(Training Hours/1000 -16)^2  115.3 39.8 187.1
(20.5)*** (25.1) (339.0)
D2*(Training Hours/1000 -33)^2  -68.9 -27.4 53.0
(8.7)*** (9.8)*** (99.4)
D3*(Training Hours/1000 -125)^2   11.6 7.1 -21.9
(.61)*** (0.68)*** (8.9)**
Observations 5,511 3,908 5,511
P-Value F-test all slopes=0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3: Estimates of the Cost Function 
The table presents the estimates of the cost function. Column (1) presents the estimates with ordinary least squares, column (2) with
first differences and column (3) with SYS-GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis, *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *
Significant at 10%. D1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when total annual training hours in the firm is higher than 15,000, D2 is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when total annual training hours in the firm is higher than 33,000 and D3 is a dummy variable equal to
1 when total annual training hours in the firm is higher than 125,000. Depreciation Rate:  5% 10% 17% 25% 100%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All Firms in Sample  14% 10% 9% 1% -28%
Firms not providing training 0% -4% -7% -14% -64%
Firms providing training 27% 22% 24% 17% 4%
Table 4: Marginal Return of a Training Hour for All Employees 
Table reports the average marginal internal rate of return for different assumptions on the (time invariant)
human capital depreciation in the firm. Marginal benefis and marginal costs were obtained with the SYS-
GMM estimates in columns (3) of table 2 and column (3) of table 4, respectively. Dependent variable: 
Log Real Value Added per 
Employee








Value Added  per Employeet-1 0.243 -
[0.113]**
Training Stock  t 0.001 0.0006
[0.001] [0.0003]*
Training Stock  t-1 -0.001 -
[0.001]
Log Employees  t 0.734 0.7718
[0.241]*** [0.117]***
Log Employees  t-1 -0.149 -
[0.242]
Log Capital Stockt 0.132 0.2476
[0.120] [0.045]***
Log Capital Stockt-1 0.06 -
[0.111]
Occupations: 
Share top managerst 5.0660 3.7722
[6.131] [3.102]*
Share top managerst-1 -2.5100 -
[5.017]
Share managerst 4.2640 4.9432
[6.654] [2.87]*
Share managerst-1 -1.2060 -
[5.179]
Share intermediary workerst 5.0550 5.9298
[7.091] [3.110]*
Share intermediary workerst-1 -1.0770 -
[5.411]
Share qualified workerst 4.5500 5.0089
[6.612] [2.877]*
Share qualified workerst-1 -1.2810 -
[5.227]
Share semi-qualified workerst 4.2190 4.828
[6.666] [2.881]*
Share semi-qualified workerst-1 -1.1040 -
[5.272]
Share non-qualified workerst 3.8750 4.8915
[6.365] [2.879]*
Share non-qualified workerst-1 -0.9260 -
[5.079]
Share apprenteces  t 3.2520 4.8873
[6.329] [2.920]*
Share apprenteces  t-1 -0.1990 -
[4.986]
Share High Educated workerst 1.4930 2.3461
[1.161] [0.561]***
Share High Educated workerst-1 0.1220 -
[0.414]
Share males workforcet -1.09 0.8308
[1.375] [0.331]***
Share males workforcet-1 1.772 -
[1.320]
Observations 2,816 2,816
Autocorrelation Coefficient  - 0.1256
[0.057]***
Columns (1) and (2) present the estimates of equation (3.3) and (3.4) in the text, respectively, with SYS-GMM,
assuming that (time invariant) human capital depreciation in the firm is 17%. Standard errors in parenthesis,
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. The regressions also include year, region,
sector dummies and a cubic polinomial on average age workforce. 





















Depreciation Rate:  5% 10% 17% 25% 100%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Training Stock  0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0013
(0.0003)* (0.0003)* (0.0003)* (0.0003)* (0.0008)
Log Employees 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.85
(0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.12)*** (0.14)***
Observations 2,816 2,816 2,816 2,816 2,816
P-Value Over-Identification Test 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.33
P-Value Common Factor Restrictions 0.54 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.42
Table A2: Production Function Estimates: Sensitivity to Different Depreciation Rates
The table presents the SYS-GMM estimates of equation (3.4) in the text for different assumptions on the (time invariant) human capital
depreciation in the firm. Standard errors in parenthesis, *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All
specifications include the following variables (point estimates not reported): capital stock, share occupation group, share low educated
workers, share males workforce, cubic polinomial in average age, year dummies, region dummies and 2-digit sector dummies. 